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Professor Laurence Tribe has recently made some interesting observations on the usefulness of analogies
from the physical sciences in understanding constitutional law and the role of the Supreme Court. [FN1]
Tribe's observations are made more valuable by his good sense in not pushing them too far: he does not
suggest that constitutional law is "just like" quantum mechanics, or that lawyers can derive concrete legal
answers from the paradigms of modern physics. Rather, he suggests that just as classical constitutional
thought was strongly influenced by Newtonian paradigms of clockwork precision, regularity, and
objectivity, [FN2] so modern constitutional thought might gain from an appreciation of post-Newtonian
concepts like "observer effects" and the ability of objects to influence one another at a distance by distorting
the very fabric of the space they occupy.
Tribe makes a number of interesting points, but he does not discuss one aspect of modern science that
seems particularly applicable to current constitutional debate. That aspect is "chaos" theory, invented by
mathematicians and widely used by scientists, which has to do with the discovery that even seemingly
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simple and determinate systems are capable of displaying apparently random-and genuinely unpredictablebehavior. [FN3] Chaos theory, which deals with "orderly disorder created by simple processes," [FN4] may
be an especially useful source of analogy because it suggests an important parallel between constitutional
scholarship and modern physics-the degree to which both are engaged in a quest for "grand theories" that
will explain events without contradictions or messy uncertainties. [FN5] And the lessons of chaos theory
suggest that, difficult as such an effort might be for physicists, it is *111 likely to be much tougher for
lawyers. The reason, as we will see, is that lawyers generally demand more from our theories than do
scientists nowadays; [FN6] we try too hard to find theories that predict outcomes, and we despair
unnecessarily when such efforts fail. Worse yet, we do these things largely out of a misguided effort to be
"scientific," when scientists themselves have managed to come to terms with uncertainty, and even to put
it to work.
To make this clear, it is worth backing up a bit and providing a rudimentary explanation of what chaos
theory is all about.
Simply put, chaos theory describes the manner in which even very simple systems can behave in
unpredictable ways in response to two kinds of factors: extreme sensitivity to initial conditions-for example,
when a person misses a bus that runs every ten minutes and for that reason misses a train that runs every
hour; and recursion-the feeding back of previous outcomes into the determination of the next set of results.
One of the simplest examples of chaos in a physical system is a dripping faucet, and its
regular-but-not-really drip. When a drop forms at the end of a faucet, it begins to sag downward. At a certain
point (determined in part by shape, size, and downward velocity), most of the drop detaches and falls down;
the rest springs back upward as a result of the released weight. The timing and character of the next drip
depend on how this springiness relates to the steadily increasing weight of the water remaining on the
faucet: if a drop starts its life heading down, it will break off sooner; if it starts out on the rebound, it will
last a bit longer. So the behavior of each drop depends in part on that of the drop before it, which in turn
depends on that of the previous drop, and so on. In short, the irregularity disguises a good deal of
complexity. Instead of a regular, mechanical process, the dripping faucet turns out to be wonderfully
complex, with each drip's formation shaped by prior drops.
Under classical physics, predicting the intervals between drips was seen as straightforward and
determinate-know the velocity of the water, its surface tension, and so on, and you can always predict when
each drop will fall. In the real world, the result is startlingly different. As scientist Robert Shaw has
discovered, the complexity of the system confounds efforts at prediction. [FN7] Yet, although the dripping
seems random, it follows certain patterns such that-although each drop is unpredictable-*112 the overall
pattern of dripping turns out to be structured and coherent. That is, though no one can predict when the next
drop will fall, a phase-space graph showing the distribution of drops over time will reveal the sort of
intricate, yet predictable structure we see in the multidimensional fractal graphics generated by chaos
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researchers. And though no one can predict where on the graph the next data point will fall, it is possible
to predict what the graph will look like when many such points have been plotted. The structure of the graph
is predictable, even though no single drip is. [FN8]
This structure is the characteristic that distinguishes "chaos" from mere randomness. Chaos, as used by
scientists, means order masquerading as randomness-unpredictable, yes, but by no means unstructured.
[FN9] Scientists exploring chaos theory have found this phenomenon to exist in all sorts of settings, from
the collisions of a few molecules trapped in a vacuum jar, [FN10] to the Great Red Spot of Jupiter, [FN11]
to the rhythm of the human heartbeat. [FN12] For our purposes, the point is that in the physical world,
determining what will happen when turns out to be a lot tougher than it looks. The problem is not simply
one of accumulating enough data and accurate-enough statements of physical law. Even where the
interactions are very well understood and the applicable laws are quite accurate and clear, results in specific
cases can be impossible to predict-although overall patterns are discernible.
In law, a similar situation obtains, but we don't fully realize it yet. Like the drop on the end of its faucet,
a legal principle tends to expand to its logical limits, and then break off, to be replaced by a new one.
[FN13] Yet unlike scientists, who have learned better, most legal scholars still expect to be able to predict
when and how that will happen [FN14]-and consider any theory that will not do so inadequate.
*113 The importance of predictable judicial outcomes to the Law and Economics movement is fairly
obvious, but this sort of thinking does not stop there. Robert Bork's constitutional jurisprudence, for
example, is based on the perceived need for judges to be constrained to a limited range of "correct"
outcomes, in order to prevent the judicial branch from interfering with decisions properly arrived at by the
political majority. Bork thus demands a powerful predictive ability as the test of legitimacy for
constitutional theory. [FN15] Many on the Left seem to agree. Even those seemingly nonlinear thinkers, the
Critical Legal Studies scholars, draw heavily on Marxist doctrine, which (at least in its traditional varieties)
is as doggedly deterministic and "scientific" in the old sense as any thinking to come out of the nineteenth
century. [FN16] And other legal scholars, both within and without the Critical Legal Studies camp, have
argued that, because legal principles do not yield predictable results, they are therefore of little value.
[FN17] This is an approach that embraces deterministic thinking even as it denies the possibility of its
success, and thus yields an unnecessarily bleak, even nihilistic, conclusion. [FN18]
The absurdity of expecting exact predictions in law becomes clear when we compare the complexity and
indeterminacy of the Supreme Court to the mechanical certitude of the still-unpredictable dripping faucet.
Like the drops on the faucet, each decision by the Supreme *114 Court is affected by the one that came
before. But the Court is far more complex. There is only one faucet; there are nine justices on the Supreme
Court. The faucet follows a well-defined set of physical laws; the Supreme Court justices, being human, are
very unlikely to share identical views even if they nominally adhere to the same theory of constitutional
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interpretation. And, of course, the judicial system as a whole is far more complex, and interactive, than just
the Supreme Court-yet the Supreme Court is certainly too complex on its own for anyone to predict results
reliably, as court-watchers learn each year to their chagrin. [FN19]
Despite this unpredictability, the actions of the Supreme Court are not random. Just as there is structure
within chaos, so there is pattern of sorts within the actions of the Court [FN20]-pattern that itself reflects
recursion and sensitivity to initial conditions, and that exists on both large and small scales. On a small
scale, each year's decisions affect the disposition of new cases in the pipeline, affect the decisions of parties
to settle or hold out, and affect the decisions of lawyers deciding whether to file suit at all. And, of course,
they affect the way in which subsequent cases coming before the Court are argued and addressed. Each of
these effects may have an enormous impact on the outcome of a case later in the process-say, when the case
reaches (or fails to reach) the Supreme Court.
On a larger scale, over time, the Court's decisions on many important issues have a strong effect on
politics; politics affect elections; elections affect who is appointed to the Court, which affects the Court's
decisions; and so on. The Court has in its history seesawed from a "natural rights" position, to a highly
formalist position, to one recognizing unenumerated positive rights, to one expanding enumerated rights,
to (maybe) a highly formalist position again. Not cycles, perhaps, but epicycles. [FN21] The result is, in
fact, a very orderly sort of disorder indeed, and at several levels. Such a process certainly makes it unlikely
that the Court will ever reach a truly "final" answer to very many questions that come before it, though most
theories of constitutional interpretation seem grounded in the assumption that such answers exist.
An interesting question is whether this lack of "finality" is bad. I *115 don't mean in terms of results (I
certainly disagree with those at times), but in terms of its overall effect on the nation. It is at least possible
that an inherently fluctuating judicial system is a good thing in a larger sense, by injecting a sort of "wild
card" function into our governmental system as a whole. I would like to suggest, at any rate, that there are
two kinds of potential payoffs: political and economic.
Politically, the fluidity of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence means that no coalition is set in stone over
time, and that people are often pressed to become involved in politics in order to protect their interests, even
when the judicial system has already spoken. In this sense, the Court's involvement in major questions
promotes political involvement over the long term-rather than inhibiting it, as James Bradley Thayer
suggested [FN22]-something illustrated by (for example) the revitalization of the pro-choice side of the
abortion debate in recent years.
The economic impact may be even more important. Nobel economist Mancur Olson has written of a key
danger to democracies: the development of a web of special interests that-by protecting existing economic
interests-prevents economic growth, technological innovation, and remedies for stagnation. [FN23] In
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stirring things up periodically (say in the swing from Lochner [FN24] to Wickard v. Filburn [FN25] to
Nollan [FN26]) through the very way its structure and methods promote change, the American judicial
system may tend to counteract politically inspired stagnation of the sort that Olson fears, making long-term
pacts among interest groups inherently unstable. Imagine, for example, the effect that Rutan v. Republican
Party of Illinois, [FN27] the Supreme Court's recent decision abolishing patronage hiring practices, will
have on local politics (and probably local government purchasing and contracting) across the nation.
Thus, quite possibly, the "chaotic" nature of the judicial system may mean that stagnation through
special-interest domination is unlikely over the long term, as periodic shifts by the Supreme Court lead to
the periodic need to renegotiate political/economic alliances. The payoff from this could be significant in
maintaining political and economic flexibility.
I don't know whether the Framers had this sort of thing in mind, or whether it is a happy accident of our
system of judicial review. In fact, *116 I'm not certain that the analogy that I point up here is a valid one,
and I am certainly not suggesting that the Supreme Court "really is" chaotic in the same sense that a physical
system might be. That would push the point too far. But I do think that the matter is worth looking into
further, and that the whole idea of chaos theory calls into question the need for-or even the practical
possibility of-theories of interpretation aimed at predicting results in particular cases. After all, if we can't
predict the behavior of a dripping faucet, we should surely be humble about our ability to make predictions
concerning any system that has people in it. Instead of trying so hard to predict outcomes, perhaps, like the
scientists, we should think harder about the order that lies behind the apparent randomness. I am confident
that if we think about these ideas, we will learn some interesting things indeed. [FN28]
And even if we don't actually learn anything new, some thinking about chaos theory and other aspects
of the new sciences may do us good simply by clearing away some cobwebby ideas from our collective
intellectual attic. In spite of the efforts of the Legal Realists, much of legal thinking is still undergirded by
efforts to make law "scientific"-and the idea of "science" that lies behind those efforts remains thoroughly
rooted in a nineteenth century linear determinism that has in fact been significantly abandoned by scientists
today.
*117 The real world, as scientists have learned, is far more complex than nineteenth century doctrines
allow for, and the answers are often not as clear as we would wish. But the complexities of the real world
also allow for a kind of beauty and deep structure that more simplistic approaches cannot comprehend.
Scientists already realize this:
As one physicist put it: "Relativity eliminated the Newtonian illusion of absolute space and time;
quantum theory eliminated the Newtonian dream of a controllable measurement process; and chaos
eliminates the Laplacian fantasy of deterministic predictability." ... The simplest systems are now seen
to create extraordinarily difficult problems of predictability. Yet order arises spontaneously in those
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systems-chaos and order together. Only a new kind of science could begin to cross the great gulf ....
[FN29]
Perhaps in time we can develop a new kind of legal science, one that recognizes the relationship among
legal institutions, legal rules, and the structures of law that they generate. [FN30] Rules need not constrain
results with clockwork precision, but may be useful even so-not as barriers to change, but as sources, and
shapers, of change. And even if we are unable to accomplish that Herculean task, we can at least recognize
that the old Newtonian and Laplacian models that have influenced our thought for so long are now regarded
as "illusion," "dream," and "fantasy" on their home turf. In realizing that, we may achieve the freedom to
discover new models all our own, and we will at the very least gain freedom from outdated models,
borrowed from other disciplines, that have since been significantly abandoned by their creators.
Tribe's article was subtitled "What Lawyers can Learn from Modern Physics." Perhaps this one should
be subtitled, "What Lawyers can Unlearn with Help from Modern Mathematics." In the search for truth,
after all, unlearning can be as important as learning, and often proves much more difficult. But it is generally
worth the effort.
[FNa] Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. B.A., University of Tennessee, 1982; J.D., Yale
Law School, 1985. I would like to thank Fran Ansley, Tom Eisele, Rob Merges, Peter Morgan, Charlie
Silver, and mathematician Carl Wagner for some useful discussions and insights.
[FN1]. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103
Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1989).
[FN2]. See, e.g., M. Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself: The Constitution in American Culture
17-22 (1986) (prominence of machine imagery in constitutionalism from the time of Jefferson to that of
Holmes and Woodrow Wilson).
[FN3]. J. Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science 250-51 (1987).
[FN4]. Id. at 266.
[FN5]. Compare S. Hawking, A Brief History of Time 165-69 (1988) (discussing "grand theory" efforts
in physics) with M. Tushnet, Red, White and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (1988)
(discussing "grand theory" efforts in law).
[FN6]. See, e.g., Brush, Prediction and Theory Evaluation: The Case of Light Bending, 246 Science 1124
(1989).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=975139

[FN7]. The "dripping faucet" discussion, and all else about chaos theory here, is from J. Gleick, supra note
3, at 262-67. For a more technical (and much longer) account, see R. Shaw, The Dripping Faucet as a Model
Chaotic System (1984); Shaw, Strange Attractors, Chaotic Behavior, and Information Theory, 36a
Zeitschrift für Naturforschung 80 (1981). Gleick's book remains by far the best treatment of this topic for
nontechnical readers; for a much more technical treatment aimed at engineers and scientists, see H. Stewart
& J. Thompson, Nonlinear Dynamics and Chaos (1986).
[FN8]. See J. Gleick, supra note 3, at 266:
In three dimensions, especially, the patterns emerged, resembling loopy trails of smoke left by an
out-of-control sky-writing plane. Shaw was able to match plots of the experimental data with data
produced by his analog computer model, the main difference being that the real data was always fuzzier,
smeared out by noise. Even so, the structure was unmistakable.
[FN9]. See id. at 266-67 ("Truly random data remains spread out in an undefined mess. But
chaos-deterministic and patterned-pulls the data into visible shapes. Of all the possible pathways of disorder,
nature favors just a few.").
[FN10]. Id. at 202-09.
[FN11]. Id. at 53-56.
[FN12]. Id. at 280-84.
[FN13]. Cf. B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 51 (1921) (legal principle expands to the limit
of its logic).
[FN14]. See, e.g., Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90 Yale L.J. 1238, 1238 (1981)
(arguing for interdisciplinary study of legal evolution "to understand, to predict, and to influence changes
in legal rules and in the institutions that they shape"); Posner, Volume One of the Journal of Legal Studies:
An Afterword, 1 J. Legal Stud. 437, 437 (1972) (goal of legal studies is "to make precise, objective, and
systematic observations of how the legal system operates in fact and to discover and explain the recurrent
patterns in the observations-the 'laws' of the system").
[FN15]. R. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 140-41 (1990). For more
on Bork's theories, see Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1365 (1990); Reynolds, Sex, Lies and
Jurisprudence: Robert Bork, Griswold, and the Philosophy of Original Understanding, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 1045
(1990).
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[FN16]. For a discussion of Critical Legal Studies' roots in two different kinds of Marxism-the "critical" and
"scientific" wings-see Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal
Scholarship, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1669, 1677 & n.58 (1982); see also A. Gouldner, The Two Marxisms 38-40
(1980) (proposing and explaining the "critical"-"scientific" dichotomy). Of course, the diverse character of
the Critical Legal Studies movement makes all generalizations a bit iffy. See generally Hutchinson &
Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought,
36 Stan. L. Rev. 199, 220-22 (1984); Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate
History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 391, 398-408 (1984) (all discussing
relationship between Critical Legal Studies and the varieties of Marxism); Sparer, Fundamental Human
Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal Studies
Movement, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 509, 527-52 (1984).
[FN17]. See Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 Yale L.J. 1, 4 n.8 (1984)
(discussing nihilism and rationalism and their influence on legal theory). But see Note, The Scientific Model
in Law, 75 Geo. L.J. 1967, 1984-86 (1987) (rejecting argument that scientific analogy to law fails because
of indeterminacy of legal results).
[FN18]. See Singer, supra note 17. Rationalists, Singer notes, believe that rational foundations are both
necessary and possible in formulating legitimate ethical systems. Nihilists, he says, believe that such
foundations are necessary, but not possible. Thus, "[n]ihilism is only a partial rejection of rationalism ....
[A] nihilist would argue that a rational foundation is necessary to sustain values but that no such foundation
exists or can be identified. This sort of nihilism leads directly to psychological feelings of impotence and
despair ...." Id.
[FN19]. Cf. Kornhauser & Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 Yale L.J. 82, 83 (1986) (theory of adjudication
should account for complex group decision-making processes in multijudge courts); Leff, Economic
Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 Va. L. Rev. 451, 476 (1974) ("'If a state of affairs
is the product of n variables, and you have knowledge of or control over less than n variables, if you think
you know what's going to happen when you vary "your" variables, you're a booby."').
[FN20]. Erwin Chemerinsky hints at this. Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The
Vanishing Constitution, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 43, 61-74 (1989).
[FN21]. Some scholars link this shift directly to the political effects of Court decisions in much the fashion
I have suggested. See Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class, and the Future of Civil Rights Scholarship,
74 Cornell L. Rev. 993, 1031-35 (1990).
[FN22]. J. Thayer, John Marshall 103-07 (1901) (too-easy resort to judicial review will "dwarf the political
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capacity of the people").
[FN23]. M. Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities
(1982). For a clear and insightful review of Olson's work, see Schuck, Review Essay: The Politics of
Economic Growth, 2 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 359 (1984).
[FN24]. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
[FN25]. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
[FN26]. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
[FN27]. 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2735 (1990).
[FN28]. Such analysis is a project for another day and another article. However, here is one thought that I
find intriguing: Chaos researchers have come to the conclusion that chaotic processes are-despite, or more
properly because of, their unpredictability-more stable than linear processes. As Gleick summarizes:
[P]hysiologists have also [begun] to see chaos as health. It has long been understood that
nonlinearity in feedback processes serves to regulate and control. Simply put, a linear process, given a
slight nudge, tends to remain slightly off track. A nonlinear process, given the same nudge, tends to
return to its starting point....
With all such control phenomena, a critical issue is robustness: how well can a system withstand
small jolts. Equally critical in biological systems is flexibility: how well can a system function over
a range of frequencies. A locking-in to a single mode can be enslavement, preventing a system from
adapting to change. Organisms must respond to circumstances that vary rapidly and unpredictably;
no heartbeat or respiratory rhythm can be locked into the strict periodicities of the simplest physical
models, and the same is true of the subtler rhythms of the rest of the body.
J. Gleick, supra note 3, at 292-93. Of course, courts are not themselves living creatures, but they are
complex dynamic systems, so that many of these considerations of robustness and flexibility apply to them,
as to biological systems. If that is true, it seems to me that we have additional reason to beware of theories
of adjudication that would enforce a rigid and linear system on the courts, since such a system might well
lead to instability on the part of the judicial system, and thus perhaps of the political system as a whole. Cf.
Waldrop, Spontaneous Order, Evolution, and Life, 247 Science 1543, 1545 (1990) ("[E]volution drives
living systems to a critical point halfway between these two extremes, where they can maintain a vital mix
of stability and change.... Langton calls this hypothetical point 'the edge of chaos,' and suggests that it may
be a fundamental characteristic of any complex dynamical system ....").
[FN29]. J. Gleick, supra note 3, at 6-8. The physicist quoted is Joseph Ford.
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[FN30]. Cf. Clark, supra note 14, at 1242-56 (discussing growth and survival of legal rules in common law
courts); Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1934) (discussing American
Constitution not as document but as living institution). See generally C. Black, Structure and Relationship
in Constitutional Law (1969) (analyzing constitutional law questions by drawing inferences from structures
and relationships created by Constitution).
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